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Abstract
Modern deep neural networks are often vulnerable to ad-
versarial samples. Based on the first optimization-based at-
tacking method, many following methods are proposed to
improve the attacking performance and speed. Recently,
generation-based methods have received much attention
since they directly use feed-forward networks to generate
the adversarial samples, which avoid the time-consuming
iterative attacking procedure in optimization-based and
gradient-based methods. However, current generation-
based methods are only able to attack one specific target
(category) within one model, thus making them not appli-
cable to real classification systems that often have hun-
dreds/thousands of categories. In this paper, we propose
the first Multi-target Adversarial Network (MAN), which
can generate multi-target adversarial samples with a single
model. By incorporating the specified category information
into the intermediate features, it can attack any category of
the target classification model during runtime. Experiments
show that the proposed MAN can produce stronger attack
results and also have better transferability than previous
state-of-the-art methods in both multi-target attack task and
single-target attack task. We further use the adversarial
samples generated by our MAN to improve the robustness
of the classification model. It can also achieve better clas-
sification accuracy than other methods when attacked by
various methods.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been significantly
successful in many artificial intelligence tasks such as im-
∗Equal contribution.
†Nenghai Yu and Xiaogang Wang are the corresponding authors.
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Figure 1. The comparison between our MAN and previous target
attack methods. Our network can generate adversarial sample to
all classes by training a single model once while others need indi-
vidual models for each class.
age classification [16, 33, 12], object detection [8, 29, 20],
and natural language processing [35, 7]. However, recent
studies [32, 23, 21] showed that DNNs are vulnerable and
easy to be attacked by adversarial samples. By adding small
perturbation onto an image, it is difficult to differentiate ad-
versarial sample from the original image visually but can
mislead modern classification model into definitely incor-
rect categories easily, which may produce severe security
threat for real application systems such as auto-driving and
face verification. Adversarial samples also possess the char-
acteristic of transferability, which means adversarial sample
generated for attacking one model could also mislead an-
other model. Thus much attention has been concentrated
on this phenomenon to better understand the weaknesses of
DNNs, as well as to develop and strengthen the robustness
of deep networks.
The pioneering work from [32] used an optimization-
based method to generate adversarial samples. Then many
different types of methods [23, 21, 26, 31] were proposed
to improve the attacking performance and speed. For ex-
ample, Goodfellow et al. [9] proposed the first gradient-
based method, which can attack DNNs effectively by us-
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ing the back-propagated gradient to update the input im-
age with small perturbations iteratively. Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [21] designed an iterative linearization of the classi-
fier to generate minimal perturbations that are sufficient to
change classification label. Although these optimization-
based and gradient-based methods can produce very good
attacking results, they often rely on a very time-consuming
iterative procedure, which impose a great computation bur-
den for real attacking systems.
Recently, generation-based methods [1, 28, 36] received
much attention in the literature. They directly trained a gen-
eration model to learn how to transform input images to ad-
versarial samples. This kind of methods can be viewed as
the acceleration versions of above optimization-based and
gradient-based methods. By training on a large scale of im-
ages with the pre-defined attacking object, these models do
not need to access the target model again and can generate
adversarial samples just with a fast forward pass during the
runtime. However, one of the critical problems of current
generation-based methods is that they are only able to re-
alize single-target attack, meaning that adversarial samples
generated by one model can only mislead the prediction of
the attacked model to one specific predefined category dur-
ing training. If we want to mislead the attacked model to
another category, a new model needs to be trained, which is
both time and storage consuming. Therefore, they are not
feasible to real classification systems which contain hun-
dreds/thousands of categories.
Motivated by these shortcomings, we propose a novel
framework called Multi-target Adversarial Network (MAN),
which aims to generate multi-target attack samples by train-
ing the adversarial model once. As illustrated in Figure 1,
MAN does not require specific attack target in training and
can produce target adversarial samples for all categories in a
dataset. Compared with existing single-target attack meth-
ods, MAN just trains once for all categories rather than
training different models for different categories.
As shown in Figure 2(a), MAN adopts the encoder-
decoder network to embed the target information from in-
correct categories and appearance information from input
images to generate adversarial samples. It accomplishes the
target-independent adversarial training by a simple frame-
work with intuitive loss functions. Moreover, through ex-
tensive experiments, we find that the adversarial sample
generated by such a model has strong transferability. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the adversarial samples generated by MAN.
When we adopt different target information, MAN enables
the attack samples to effectively inherit the appearance in-
formation from the original image, while cheating the pre-
trained model with high fooling rates.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
present the task of multi-target attack that generates
target adversarial samples for all the categories in a
dataset using one single model. We accomplish this
purpose by presenting a novel Multi-target Adversarial
Network (MAN), which can produce multi-target ad-
versarial samples by training a single model, and can
significantly reduce the training cost and model stor-
age.
• In the single-target scenario, the proposed method
achieves competitive and better attack performance
and generalization ability, compared to state-of-the-
art methods [1, 28] in various popular deep architec-
tures [30, 12]. For example, MAN achieves 98.55% at-
tack accuracy on the CIFAR10 dataset against VGG16
and 88.95% when transferring to ResNet32, outper-
forming [28] by 4.39% and 12.49% respectively. For
the multi-target attack scenario, our model can main-
tain these advantages by training the multi-target ad-
versarial network only once.
• The generated attack samples by MAN effectively im-
prove the robustness and adversarial defense ability
of attacked models. Take the attacked model pre-
trained on the CIFAR10 as an example, when using the
strongest attack samples generated by MAN to fine-
tune ResNet32, the classification accuracy is improved
from 10.58% to 81.14%, outperforming other counter-
parts by 17.74%.
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial Attack Methods
Current methods for generating adversarial samples can
be divided into three categories: optimization-based [32, 2],
gradient-based [9, 17, 5], and generation-based [1, 28].
Optimization-based methods model the generation of ad-
versarial samples as an optimization problem and use op-
timizers like box-constrained L-BGFS [6] or Adam [14]
to solve it, which are powerful but quite slow. Goodfel-
low et al. [9] proposed the first gradients-based method
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Alexey et al. [17]
performed small step size iteratively to get better attacking
performance (I-FGSM). The speed of gradient-based meth-
ods is linearly related to the number of parameters of tar-
get models and iteration numbers, and is often faster than
optimization-based methods. However, due to their inherent
model-specific mechanism, previous gradient-based meth-
ods have relatively weak transferability. Dong et al. [5]
further introduced momentum into the iterative steps (MI-
FGSM) to get better transferability. Different from the it-
erative procedure used in the above two types of methods,
generation-based methods directly use generation models
to transform input images into adversarial samples. For ex-
ample, an auto-encoder like network was adopted in [1],
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Figure 2. The structure of Multi-Target Adversarial Network (MAN), (a) shows the overall architecture, (b) and (c) show two different
label encoding and feature approaches, (d) and (e) are the architecture for image encoder and decoder respectively.
and U-Net and ResNet were leveraged in [28]. Although
these methods need extra time to train, they can generate
adversarial samples at a constant speed and do not need
to access to the target model again in the inference stage.
The biggest limitation of all current generation-based meth-
ods is that they are only able to attack one specific category
with one model, which is very unfriendly for real attacking
systems. By contrast, the multi-target adversarial network
proposed by us enables attacking any category of a classifi-
cation model with similar attack success rate, and can also
bring better transferability for the adversarial attack task as
well as model robustness for the adversarial training task.
2.2. Adversarial Defence Methods
There were also many methods proposed to defend
against adversarial attack. Adversarial training used in [10,
18, 34] trained a robust network against adversarial attack
by adding the adversarial sample into the training set and
jointly trained with original samples. In [11, 24, 3, 19],
they used preprocessing procedures to remove the adversar-
ial noise of the input images before feeding into the target
model. Other methods [34, 25, 27] used some regularizes
or smooth labels to make the target model more robust to
the perturbation on input images. In the methods mentioned
above, adversarial training is the most effective method. But
it requires enough adversarial samples for training, so the
speed of generating adversarial samples determines the ef-
fectiveness and performance of adversarial training. In this
paper, we focus on how to generate adversarial sample to at-
tack all categories with high speed, and this will be helpful
for training more robust models.
3. Multi-Target Attack
Non-target vs. Single-target attack. Let H be a deep
neural network to be attacked, which is trained on a dataset
with K classes. For an image x with the category label
y ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, the predicted probability of the network
H for the i-th category is represented by Hi(x), where
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. The non-target adversarial attack tries to
generate a new image x∗, such that argmaxi Hi(x∗) 6= y,
It implies that predicted label of x∗ should not be the
ground-truth label of x. By contrast, single-target at-
tack aims to generate the adversarial sample x∗, such that
argmaxi Hi(x∗) = t, where t 6= y is a predefined class
label that is specified in the testing stage. According to the
above definition, the non-target attack is much easier to re-
alize than single-target attack, since it only requires the at-
tacked model to make different predictions between the ad-
versarial image and the corresponding original image. Be-
yond the single-target attack, this work focuses on a more
challenging task, multi-target attack, whose goal is to gen-
erate multi-target adversarial samples by a single network.
White-Box attack vs. Black-Box attack. If we have the
knowledge about the attacked model H, including model
architecture and parameters, we call such attack as a white-
box attack. In this case, the attacker can generate adversar-
ial samples directly using attack methods by accessing the
attacked model. On the contrary, for black-box scenario, the
attacker knows nothing about the target model. Therefore
the designed attacking model need stronger transferability,
which means that adversarial samples generated for attack-
ing one model could also mislead another model.
Problem Definition. In order to generate a target ad-
versarial sample x∗, a transformation function Fθ with pa-
rameters θ is defined to map the input image x to a target
domain, x∗ = Fθ(x, t). In practice, we approximate this
function by a deep neural network, where θ represents the
network parameters. The purpose of multi-target attack is to
train a network Fθ such that argmaxi Hi( Fθ(x, t) ) = t,
where t 6= y. Unlike traditional single-target attack that
trains specific network F t0 for a predefined label t0, multi-
target attack only trains a single network F for any target
label t ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
3.1. Multi-Target Adversarial Network (MAN)
Architecture Overview. The overall architecture of
MAN is shown in Figure 2 (a). It takes image x and tar-
get label t as input and generates adversarial sample x∗
corresponding to the desired target. Compared with tra-
ditional single-target adversarial networks [28], the target
label t is regarded as a discrete variable rather than a con-
stant in MAN. The range of t is from 1 to K. Accordingly,
the encoding network of MAN includes two branches, one
for extracting the appearance features from the input image,
as shown in Figure 2 (d), and the other for encoding the
target label information. The feature integration module is
also introduced to integrate the feature representation from
these two modalities. As shown in Figure 2 (e), the decoder
network with six residual blocks and two deconvolutional
layers are adopted to generate the final adversarial samples.
Two intuitive losses are employed to optimize the adver-
sarial network. One is the reconstruction loss to preserve
the appearance similarity between the original image and
the adversarial samples and the other is the classification
loss which is adopted to embed the target label information
into the attack samples. To calculate the classification loss,
the generated attack sample is fed into the attacked model,
i.e. the pretrained classification network, to predict the la-
bel. Although the parameters in the attacked model are fixed
during the MAN training, the gradients can still be passed
through this model to guide the generative subnetwork.
Variants of MAN. Next, we describe two versions of
feature integration schemes of MAN. The first one is il-
lustrated in Figure 2 (b), which is a quite straightforward
idea to integrate the image feature and label feature by con-
catenating along the channels. Given an input image x,
the image encoder first calculates the image feature map
M ∈ RC×H×W , where C, H and W indicate the num-
ber of channels, height and width of feature maps respec-
tively. The target label t is presented as the one-hot vector
t ∈ RK , where t is expanded along height and width direc-
tions to get the label feature map T ∈ RK×H×W . Then the
above two sets of feature maps are concatenated along the
channels to get a mixed one M˜′ ∈ R(K+C)×H×W . An ad-
ditional convolutional layer is adopted to reshape the mixed
feature M˜′ to M′ ∈ RC×H×W . At last, M′ is fed into
the decoder to generate the adversarial sample x∗. In this
approach, the mixed feature is generated by concatenating
the feature maps of image and target label. We denote this
model as the multi-target adversarial concatenate network
(MANc).
The second architecture of label encoder and feature in-
tegration is illustrated in Figure 2 (c). Inspired by the
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Figure 3. Adversarial samples to different target with  = 10
√
N .
Numbers are the predicted probability for the corresponding label
given by a pretrained VGG16 model.
Squeeze and Excitation Network proposed by Jie et al. [13],
we claim that different channels of feature representation
can capture diverse features for different classes. Thus the
channel-wise product, i.e. recalibration operation, is used to
integrate the label feature and image feature. In such a case,
the label encoder contains a two-layer multi-layer percep-
tron (MLP), and the output is activated by sigmoid function
σ(x) = 11+e−x . We denote t
′ as the output of MLP, which
is given by:
t′ = Fen(W, t) = σ(W2δ(W1t)), (1)
where δ is the ReLU [22] activation function,W1 ∈ RU×K
and W2 ∈ RC×U are fully connected layers, U is the num-
ber of intermediate units, t′ ∈ RC , and σ limits every el-
ement t′i ∈ (0, 1). The final integrated feature representa-
tion is presented as M′ = t′ M, where  indicates the
channel-wise product on the tensor: M′i = ti ·Mi, in which
Mi ∈ RH×W is channel-wise feature map of image feature
M = [M1,M2, . . . ,MC ]. We refer this structure as multi-
target adversarial recalibrating network (MANr).
3.2. Optimization
To optimize the network parameters, we define the ob-
jective function of MAN for target label t as follows,
L(x) = Lcls(H(Fθ(x, t)), t ) + αLre( x,Fθ(x, t)), (2)
whereH(Fθ(x, t)) is the predicted probability of the target
model on adversarial sample, t is the discrete label vari-
able, weight factor α decides the importance of two loss
terms, and Lcls is the classification loss which encourages
the attacked model make prediction to the target label. The
concrete format of loss function has massive impact on the
final result. Previous studies [1, 28, 2] tried different clas-
sification losses in their works; we found that the standard
cross-entropy loss works well in all of our experiments.
The reconstruction loss Lre measures the appearance
difference between adversarial sample and original image.
Attacked model VGG16 VGG19 Res152 Res101
VGG16
ATN [1] 88.18∗ 55.68 0.15 0.13
GAP [28] 99.89∗ 70.83 0.53 0.30
MANc 99.85∗ 85.79 0.90 0.50
MANr 99.93∗ 71.83 0.50 0.50
Res152
ATN [1] 0.07 0.08 81.95∗ 2.31
GAP [28] 19.17 16.51 99.65∗ 73.53
MANc 3.58 5.48 99.67∗ 52.75
MANr 20.47 23.74 99.72∗ 77.61
Table 1. The success rate (%) of single-target adversarial attack on
the ImageNet dataset with different target model. ∗ indicates the
white-box attacks.
It is usually measured by vector norm ||x − Fθ(x, t)||p
where p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞} [2]. In this paper, we adopt Eu-
clidean distance, i.e. L2 norm, as our measurement. To
ensure the difference between adversarial sample and the
original image is small, i.e. the perturbation is restricted to
a range. A fixed distance upper bound  is given and we
force the constraint ||x − Fθ(x, t)||2 < . In practice, we
use α to leverage the power of the two loss terms. Larger α
encourages better reconstruction quality while smaller ones
get higher success attack rate.
4. Experiments
4.1. Adversarial Attack
In this section, we evaluate the attack effectiveness of
MAN on the ImageNet [4] and the CIFAR10 [15].
General setup. On the ImageNet [4] dataset, we con-
duct the experiments by using popular network architec-
tures VGG16 [30], and ResNet152 (Res152) [12] as at-
tacked models . Meanwhile, we use VGG19 and Res101
as “black-box” model. For fair comparison, in the testing
stage, we scale the norm of all perturbations to a certain
threshold . i.e. xˆ∗ = x − ||x−Fθ(x,t)||2 (x − Fθ(x, t)).
Here xˆ∗ is the scaled adversarial sample for testing. The
threshold of the L2 norm  in our experiments is calculated
by δ
√
N , whereN = C×H×W is the dimension of input
images x. We set δ = 10 in this part and further explo-
ration on δ is listed in the ablation study. We use Adam
[14] optimizer with β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.999 to train
all of the adversarial networks. The batch size is 32. For
the CIFAR10 [15], the attacked networks are VGG16 [30]
and ResNet32 (Res32) [12], and “black-box” models are
VGG19 and Res14. We set batchsize to 128, and other set-
tings are the same as the Imagenet.
Single-target attack. In this part, we evaluate the attack
performance on the single-target attack task. We fix the in-
put label t during the single-target training process to get a
degraded version of our model. We compare the proposed
MANc and MANr with two other state-of-the-art methods
ATN [1] and GAP [28]. For all of the methods, we train ad-
Attacked model VGG16 VGG19 Res32 Res14
VGG16
ATN [1] 87.97∗ 65.71 69.85 71.81
GAP [28] 94.16∗ 77.60 76.46 78.90
MANc 97.86∗ 87.67 88.26 88.63
MANr 98.55∗ 91.07 88.95 90.33
Res32
ATN [1] 37.41 50.74 93.17∗ 69.60
GAP [28] 43.71 57.19 97.02∗ 74.30
MANc 51.27 68.11 98.86∗ 81.01
MANr 58.56 72.26 99.26∗ 79.33
Table 2. The success rate (%) of single-target adversarial attack on
the CIFAR10 dataset with different target model. ∗ indicates the
white-box attacks.
versarial models for 120K iterations, with an initial learning
rate of 0.002 and decreased by 10 after 80K iterations on the
ImageNet. On the CIFAR10 training set, we train 20K it-
erations with an initial learning rate of 0.001 and decreased
by 10 after 16K iterations. The hyperparameter α is set to
100 (1 for ATN) on the ImageNet and 800 (80 for ATN) on
the CIFAR10. During testing, adversarial samples are gen-
erated by 50K images in the ImageNet validation set and 5k
images in the CIFAR10 validation set. We use the success
rate as the evaluation metric, which is defined as the ratio
of the attacked model classifying the adversarial samples to
the target class.
Table 1 and Table 2 report the attack success rates on
two datasets. We first evaluate the white-box attack perfor-
mance. From the results, we can find that ATN performs
quite weak for all cases. Comparing with GAP, both MANc
and MANr achieve better results in most cases, e.g. MANr
achieves 98.55% attack accuracy against VGG16 on the CI-
FAR10, outperforming GAP by 4.39%.
When it comes to the black-box attack. ATN shows
very weak transferability. When transferring to a model
with similar architecture, e.g. from VGG16 to VGG19, our
MANc get 85% success rate on the ImageNet and nearly
90% on the CIFAR10, outperform GAP by over 10%.
When transferring to a model with totally different ar-
chitecture e.g. from VGG to ResNet, we find results on the
CIFAR10 decrease a bit but still higher than 88% in most
cases. But on the ImageNet, the success rate of all methods
are lower than 25%. We think this is because there are too
many categories in the ImageNet dataset, making it hard to
transfer to another model with a specific attack target.
According to the above results, our method performs
much better in most cases. We think this is because our
method splits the task into two branches. One branch guides
the generation model to generate adversarial samples simi-
lar to input as the previous methods did. The other branch
encodes the target label and provides extra guidance helping
generate more powerful adversarial samples.
Multi-target attack. In the training phase for multi-
target attack, a random target label is assigned to each train-
Attacked model VGG16 VGG19 Res152 Res101
VGG16
MANc 99.22∗ 66.81 2.48 1.42
MANr 99.13∗ 54.16 1.73 1.33
Res152
MANc 7.61 7.71 98.14∗ 55.39
MANr 5.76 6.06 98.23∗ 49.69
Table 3. The success rate (%) of multi-target adversarial attack on
the ImageNet dataset with different model. ∗ indicates the white-
box attacks.
Attacked model VGG16 VGG19 Res32 Res14
VGG16
MANc 99.14∗ 92.97 90.08 88.56
MANr 99.50∗ 95.47 92.68 89.74
Res32
MANc 76.86 86.87 99.30∗ 90.27
MANr 78.36 88.15 98.94∗ 84.98
Table 4. The success rate (%) of multi-target adversarial attack on
the CIFAR10 dataset with different model. ∗ indicates the white-
box attacks.
ing image. We train models for 280K iterations, with an ini-
tial learning rate of 0.002 and decreased by 10 after 240K
iterations on the ImageNet training set. On the CIFAR10
training set, we train 80K iterations, with an initial learn-
ing rate of 0.001 and decreased by 10 after 64K iterations.
At the evaluation phase, we randomly pick 5000 samples
from the ImageNet validation set and randomly assign ten
labels for each sample. For the CIFAR10, the validation set
contains 5000 samples and we assign all of the ten labels
to each sample. In total, there are 50K adversarial samples
generated to attack the pretrained models on each dataset.
Table 3 and Table 4 report the attack success rates of
variants of MAN on the ImageNet and on the CIFAR10 re-
spectively. For white-box case, we find our models keep a
great performance with attack accuracy over 98%. When
evaluating the black-box performance on both datasets, we
find our models also keep a high transferability. Since the
evaluation metric in Table 1, 2 and Table 3, 4 are different,
the result can not be compared directly. We make further
comparison under the same evaluation metric in the abla-
tion study.
Results show the feasibility and effectiveness of our
methods to realize the multi-target attack task. Even on a
large dataset with numerous categories, our method can still
attack arbitrary category with a single model.
There is also an interesting phenomenon that MANr per-
forms better on CIFAR10 while MANc has better results on
ImageNet. MANr re-calibrates each channel of the feature
map. It controls better when size is small. When size is
large, it is not easy to re-calibrate the feature map. MANc
concatenates feature maps to get a mixed one, which is not
influenced by the size of feature map and thus performs
evenly on both datasets. Figure 3 shows the original sam-
ples and adversarial samples generated by different target
label.
Method No. of Params Total Models Total Training Iters
ATN [1] 7.84M 1000 120M
GAP [28] 7.84M 1000 120M
MANc 10.74M 1 280K
MANr 8.55M 1 280K
Table 5. Comparison of our method with single-target methods on
Number of parameters for each model, the total number of models
used and total training iteration needed to realize attack all cate-
gories in the ImageNet.
Parameter Comparison. Table 5 lists the number of pa-
rameters for each model, the number of models needed and
the total training iterations needed to attack all categories
in the ImageNet. Previous models have about 8.3% fewer
parameters comparing with MANr, but 1K models with in
total 7840M parameters and 120M iterations are required
to attack all categories in the ImageNet. By contrast, our
method just adopts a single model with much fewer param-
eters and 0.3M iterations to achieve the same goal. Thus
our method is significantly more time and storage efficient.
4.2. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is one of the most effective method
to improve the robustness of models against adversarial at-
tack. It finetunes the network by adversarial samples with
the groundtruth labels of the images used to generate the ad-
versarial samples. In this part, we evaluate the improvement
of classification model against adversarial attack when the
adversarial samples are used for finetuning.
Setups. All of the following experiments are conducted
on the CIFAR10 dataset. To improve the robustness of the
classification model, we use adversarial samples and their
ground truth labels to finetune the pretrained networks. In
the rest part of the paper, we use “adv-model” to indicate the
model finetuned by the adversarial samples. The attacked
model architecture is ResNet32, and the adversarial samples
are generated by MANc, MANr and GAP [28] respectively
with  = 10
√
N .
For MANc and MANr, we generate adversarial samples
with random target labels and finetune the attacked model
with these samples. We also train ten GAP models with re-
spect to ten attack target, each of which is a single-target
attack model, to produce adversarial samples. We finetune
the attacked model with adversarial samples generated by
one, five and ten GAP models to explore the influence of
the number of classes used during adversarial training. The
corresponding settings are denoted as GAP1, GAP5, and
GAP10 respectively. All the adv-models are finetuned with
40K iterations with batch size 128 (64×2, each image is
coupled with its adversarial sample). The learning rate is
set to 0.001. To further evaluate the robustness of these
adv-models, we use MI-FGSM [5] and ATN [1] as attack
methods. In practice, we use MI-FGSM to generate adver-
sarial samples with random target labels and follow the op-
Attack Strength Attack Method GAP 1 GAP 5 GAP 10 MANc MANr Raw Res32
8
√
N
ATN [1] 13.38 11.60 11.37 11.17 11.43 86.41
MI-FGSM [5] 18.18 13.96 13.76 12.34 13.24 99.40
12
√
N
ATN [1] 19.40 13.50 13.08 12.57 13.28 94.56
MI-FGSM [5] 23.56 18.86 15.28 14.86 13.84 99.68
16
√
N
ATN [1] 24.93 16.09 15.27 14.69 15.88 97.97
MI-FGSM [5] 29.22 22.22 17.44 17.18 16.88 99.76
Table 6. Attack success rate (%) against classification models. Lower success rate indicate the model is more robust. ResNet32 is the
attacked model to generate adversarial samples by MI-FGSM and ATN with L2 threshold 8
√
N ,12
√
N ,16
√
N . We also add Raw Res32
(ResNet32 without adversarial training) to make sure the effectiveness of attack methods.
Attack Strength Attack Method GAP 1 GAP 5 GAP 10 MANc MANr Raw Res32
8
√
N
ATN [1] 86.17 89.48 89.85 89.91 89.36 20.77
MI-FGSM [5] 81.90 86.60 88.74 89.24 89.34 9.54
12
√
N
ATN [1] 75.48 85.38 85.70 86.06 84.87 13.04
MI-FGSM[5] 73.70 81.40 84.78 86.14 86.06 10.12
16
√
N
ATN [1] 63.41 78.87 78.64 79.15 77.17 10.78
MI-FGSM [5] 63.40 73.86 79.08 81.14 81.00 10.58
Table 7. Classification accuracy (%) for classification models. Higher accuracy indicate the model is more robust.
timal settings used in [5]. For ATN method, we follow the
generation procedure stated in Sec. 4.1. Note that all the
attack samples for testing are generated by using pretrained
ResNet32 architecture on the CIFAR10 test set.
We consider the robustness of a classification model in
two aspects. On the one hand, we define the attack success
robustness by the attack success rate of adversarial samples
to the adv-models. In such a case, a lower success rate in-
dicates the model is more robust. On the other hand, the
classification success robustness is also defined to evaluate
whether the adv-models could classify the adversarial sam-
ples to their ground truth classes. In this subsection, we set
the attack strength (threshold)  = 8
√
N, 12
√
N, 16
√
N .
Two of these thresholds are larger than that in the last part
because the adv-models has already finetuned by adversar-
ial samples. A larger threshold can also reflect the robust-
ness of adv-models against stronger attack.
Attack success robustness. We show the result of attack
success rates in Table 6. According to the results, the attack
success rate grows as the attack strength grows. When the
attack strength is small, i.e. 8
√
N , it is quite hard to use
adversarial samples to fool any of the adv-models, while
GAP1 is slightly worse than others. When the strength be-
comes larger, i.e. 12
√
N , GAP1 and GAP5 models tend to
be vulnerable to adversarial samples, which almost increase
the attack success rate by around 5%, whereas GAP10 and
our models are still robust, and the success attack rate is
slightly increased by around 2%. When the attack strength
is set to 16
√
N , GAP1 and GAP5 let over 20% adversar-
ial samples attack successfully. Other models also tend to
be vulnerable in such case, but our MANs still slightly out-
perform the GAP10. e.g. MANr can defense 0.56% more
adversarial samples against MI-FGSM attack.
Classification success robustness. We report the re-
sults of classification success robustness in Table 7. By us-
ing small attack strength, i.e. 8
√
N , all of the adv-models
can classify most adversarial samples correctly and achieve
high classification accuracy (larger than 80%). When the at-
tack strength becomes larger, i.e. 12
√
N , the accuracy of the
GAP1 model decrease obviously, while other adv-models
can still maintain a promising accuracy over 80%. When
setting the attack strength to 16
√
N , only GAP10, MANc
and MANr can keep the accuracy around 80%. Moreover,
our methods get better results. e.g. For MI-FGSM attack
method, MANc can get 81.14% accuracy, outperforming
GAP10 by 2.06%
In summary, when we compare the adversarial train-
ing results among GAP1, GAP5 and GAP10 models, we
find that when the number of target models increases, the
adv-models can obtain more ability to resist the adversar-
ial attack, which demonstrates the necessity to retrain the
attacked model using multiple single-target attack models.
At the same time, compared with single-target methods,
our models show better performance for almost all cases.
It demonstrates that our methods can generate diverse ad-
versarial samples to promote the retraining efficiency of
adv-models. Our methods can use fewer training time and
storage resources to produce richer adversarial samples and
make the attacked models more robust.
4.3. Ablation Study
Weight factor α. In this part, we explore the influence
of weight factor α for attack result. As we stated above,
a larger α encourages better reconstruction quality while
smaller ones lead to higher attack rate. When evaluating
the results, we compare the attack rate under a certain re-
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Figure 4. (a) The relation between weight factor α and attack suc-
cess rate with different  on the CIFAR10 to a pretrained VGG16
model. (b) The attack accuracy under different threshold .
VGG16 VGG19 Res32 Res14
Res32
Single-target 58.71 75.69 99.70∗ 90.51
Multi-target 67.69 82.19 99.16∗ 93.37
Table 8. The success rate (%) of MANr based Single-target and
Multi-target attack model. Multi-target model attack the same tar-
get as single ones.
construction threshold , and the influence of it becomes
complicated.
Figure 4 (a) shows the attack success rate on the CI-
FAR10 dataset with different weight factor α to a VGG16
model. We can find that smaller α performs well when the
permitted threshold  is large. Larger α often performs bet-
ter when the  at a small value, but sometimes it may depress
the performance among all  cases.
Threshold . In this part, we explore the influence of
different threshold . Larger  means more severe change
to the original image. We test the attack accuracy under
different  from 2
√
N to 20
√
N with step size 2
√
N .
Figure 4 (b) shows the attack success rate on the CI-
FAR10 dataset. We find that smaller  (such as 2
√
N , 4
√
N )
limits the success rate. When  increases, success rate grows
at the same time. 10
√
N and 12
√
N get the best perfor-
mance so we use 10
√
N in our main experiments. But when
the  is too large, the performance decreases a bit. We think
this is because perturbation with too large  impedes the
representation of adversarial features.
Transferability. In this part, we make further explo-
ration about the transferability of single-target attack model
and multi-target attack model. Different from last section
which we take more iterations to train the multi-target at-
tack model, in this part we use same training iterations for
all models. For single-target models, we fix the attack target
label during training, while multi-target models accept ran-
dom input labels. In testing phase, we use the same attack
target for multi-target models as used in single target ones.
The results are listed in Table 8. According to the re-
sults, even we train two models with the same iterations,
the multi-target model performs better transferability than
the single-target model in all black-box cases, e.g. it obtains
8.98% gain when transferring from ResNet32 to VGG16.
VGG16 VGG19 Res32 Res14
VGG16
MANc 97.86∗ 87.67 88.26 88.63
MANr 98.55∗ 91.07 88.95 90.33
Res32
MANc 51.27 68.11 98.86∗ 81.01
MANr 58.56 72.26 99.26∗ 79.33
VGG16+Res32
MANc 98.90∗ 96.75 99.39∗ 96.79
MANr 99.60∗ 98.07 99.69∗ 98.06
Table 9. The success rate (%) of multi-target adversarial attack
against different models on the CIFAR10 dataset. The last row
indicates combine VGG16 and ResNet32 as white-box model.
We conjecture that the competition between different target
label promote the model to learn more generalization fea-
ture with more generalization ability and this result proves
our conjecture.
Model Ensemble. We also try to combine different at-
tacked models during the training process, the last row of
Table 9 shows the success rate jointly trained on VGG16
and ResNet32 models. It is obvious that ensemble different
attacked models make the transferability much better than a
single architecture. Considering the performance transfer-
ring form ResNet32 to VGG19, ensemble method exceeds
the single architecture over 10%. This is reasonable since
the network attempt to fit various architectures, thus it can
be generalized well to other unseen models.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial model
named Multi-target Adversarial Network (MAN) to deal
with the multi-target attack problem. It can produce multi-
target adversarial samples by training a single model and
significantly reduces the training cost and model storage.
By embedding the target label information into the gen-
erated adversarial samples, a great improvement on attack
ability and transferability is shown by these samples. MAN
also produces diverse adversarial samples efficiently for ad-
versarial training, which greatly improves the robustness of
models. Future work may lie on adding random noise or
introducing additional regularization term to generate ad-
versarial samples with better transferability to black-box at-
tack. More applications about the adversarial samples are
also considered to be developed, e.g. adversarial attack un-
der more realistic constraints.
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